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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
Leon G. Pritchett, Administrator

of the Estate of Mary H. Pritchett,
Dereased,

Plaintiff-Respondent.

- vs -

Case No.

148765

Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance
Company, a corporation

Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
ThiH is an action to enforce payment on a hospital
msnrance policy.

DISPOSITION lN THE LOWER COUR'r
I 'laintiff was awarded $3,513.00 for medical and
l111:-;pitn l expenses

2
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of trial court's decision.

rrhe decPaSPd applied for hospital lJlHUranee fr0111
Def Pndant insnrancf• company.
On the application, dt>ceased intPntionall)· ornittPd
and rnisrPpresented the state of her health and pm:1
i llnPs~ws she had eontracted.
ThP l)pfendant, rPlyinµ; on thP misrPpre:wnte(1 ;..'.dOrt
stat1• of l1Palth, issuPd deceaS('d fnll im;nntlH'P <'OY<>rag1·

llad tl1r• IJeft>ndant known thl' past eonditions and
fH't•sent statl' of d<>eeased's !11-'alth, Defrridant \\'ould Jl(lf
l1av<> isslwd tl1I-' sanw poliey hnt \\·oukl havl; <'lwng1·d
thP tl'.l"lllS - prohalil>' h:,r issninp; a ri<l<>r ("~<·u1pti11g <'n
tain illrn•ss<•s.
Both th1~ d1•e1•as<'d and IH'rwf'i<'ian·, Plai11ti fl' lrnd
knowlPdg-P of' tl11· rnisl'<'(ll'C'S<'nta1ions :ind in1l•Jld(·d i 11
d<-•f'nrnd the DefPndant.

'I'Jw dP<'l;asPd latPr di1·d fl'<l1t1 an afrlidio11 wl1i('l1 1!1'
trial eonrt found not to he 1•mrnedPd with m1\· of' 111 1
ilJnpssc•s s11e Jiad fail(•d to distln\'1'.
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Defendant, learning of the fraud, refused to pay
over the proceeds from the policy.
The heneficiary instituted suit to recover.
The trial court allowed recovery. It found that although Plaintiff and deceased had defrauded the company, the Defendant could not prevent recovery because
it had "unclean hands" since its application form was

too brief. Furthermore, the trial court found that the
Plaintiff's and deceased's fraud would not deny Plaintiff
rPcowry since deceased did not die from an affliction
~he

failed to disclose: therefore, the fraud was not ma-

tPrial.
On appeal, Defendant takes issue with both of these
rn1wlnsiom; of law.
ARGlTMEN"T
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE DENIED RECOVERY
RECAUSE OF FRAUD.

'l 1 he Plaintiff should be denied recovery because of
i'1n11d

and

~::n_19_,~

['toh Code Ami. (Rupp. 1965) Rince:
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A.

"Unclean hands" is not a defense to the statut('

B.

Assuming that it is a defense, Plaintiff is not
entitled to it, because of his and deceased\
culpability

C.

Assuming "unclean hands'' def <>m;e is available
under the statute, Plaintiff should Le denied
this equitable renwdy sinee Defondant di<l not
have "urn·lean hands.''

From the findings of the trial court, it is clear that
Defendant made out a prirna facie ddense to th<' contrad on the grounds of fraud. Tht> trial court's s<>em1d
finding of fad reads:
"(T)he deceased and her husband knt'w at tlw
time they made application for a health insuraiw1·
policy that they had not made a full <fo;e]o:srn <'
of all the facts."
Finding Four reads:
"That had full disclo.sure hPPn ma<ltt th<• cornpa11.1
would ha.v<' attarhed a waiver for tl10 ( <fowlosed I
disease.''

Finding

~even

reads:

''(A)ll penwn involvPd aded \\'itli a dPgn'<'
intent to defrand as follo\\·s ·

111

A.

The deceased and her husband deliberately concealed the bad state of deceased's health." (emphasis added)

Clearly these findings constitute a prima facie case
of fraud both at common law, Patterson Insurance Law,
380-81, and under ~31-19-8, Utah Code Ann. (1965 Supp.).
The remedy at Common Law is to allow the insurer to
rescind the contract. Patterson sitpra1. Substantially the
same remedy is given by Utah Statutes.
Section :31-19-8 reads:
"Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of
facts ... shall not prevent a recovery unless
(a) fradulent; or
(b) Material . . . to the acceptance of the
risk . . . ; or
( c) the insurer in good faith either would not
. have issued, reinstated, or renewed (the
policy) at the same rate, ... or would not have
provided coverage with respect to the hazard
resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been
known."
'l'hus, any of the factors listt'd in subsections (a),
(h) or ( r) will prevPnt a rerovery on the policy. The
i'indinµ;s, quotPd ahove, show that all threp <'Xist. r(1he

deceased and the Plaintiff, were acting fradulently
(Finding 7, subsection (a)) ; the non disclosure was material to the acceptaence of the risk (finding 4, subseetion ( b)) ; and the insurer would have issued a rider
had the non disclosed fact been known (finding 4, subsection ( c)). Thus, the first issue on appeal is what
effect does "unclean hands" on the part of the insurer
have (assuming for thP purposes of Argument I that
the insurer had "unclean hands").
Under the statute, the only provision that requires
good faith on the part of the insurer is subsection (c).
The statute is written in the disjunctive; a finding of
either (a), ( b) or ( c) prevents recovery on the contract. Thus, under the statute the Plaintiff should still
be denied recovery on thP basis of subst->ctions (a) or
( h). Even under common law, the factor of "unclean
hands" was not a defense. Admittedly, "unclean hands"
was a defense in equity. -Whether this defense is available in an action for statutory fraud is qrn-'stionablt>.
But assuming that it is available generally, it should
not be in this case. The trial court found that the
Plaintiff's also had "unclean handH." This faetor ha~
always been considered by equity courtH to prevent thP
defensE'. ln fact, it has always bePn eonsidered a prerequisite before equity will act, that the party asking fot
the equitable remedy, have "clean hands."
Thus ' the court 8l10ul<l denv. the Plaintiff's a n'
covery smee they eommitted a fraud because'.
-
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1. The defense of "unclean hands" is not available
in an action on the statute.
2. Assuming that the defense is available, generally,
the Plaintiffs are not entitled to the equitable
remedy since they also were culpable.
Assuming that the equitable doctrine of "unclean
hands" is available to the Plaintiff in this action, her
n'covery should still he denied since the Defendant did
not havP "unclean hands."

rl 1 ht' trial court found that the insurance company
had "nnelean hands" because its application form \Vas
too short. And this, according to the findings of fact,
t-ncouraged incomplete disclosure; finally, this presumnhly, gave the Defendant knowledge of the concealment
or omission and made Defendant guilty of "unclean
hands." The Defendant fails to see the logic of tlte trial
<' 1Jnrt's rei:;oning, and aI'f.,'1WS, that its judgment, as a
niatter of law, should be n•versecl. The form that the
DPf<·ndant insnranee company nses is no shorter than
than most otlwr cornpanit>s. 1 f the nwre briefness of
llie form waives tlw in:·rnrc>r's deft>nse of fraud, cartt'
hlanl'lw aut lrnrity will lw gin'n to those applying for
i1::;:.manee to commit francl. Thos1• who have already
1'<11t1rnith•d fraud, to get lower premiums or to get unin,1irabl1· i11tnPsts insured \\-ill lw exoneratt•d from any
c1iJpalJj]jty. rl 1 llOSC' JWl'SOl1S, who intentionally perpel 1at('d a dc·eeit, will recover

1'he size of the Defendant's form, if relevant at all ,

was sufficient for the medical history of most person~.
How can it be, then, that this si7.e encouragPs franc!'
DPfendant argues that it cannot.

]'urtlwmore, Defrndant arglws that tlw mere si;w
of a form rannnt, as a matter of law, <•neourage fraud.
Admittedly, the wording in an appli('ation, may lw <·onducive to inrorrect answers, hnt it takPs quitP a strPfrh
of the imagination to hold that tlw size of tl1P blank
spac<'S t>ncourages fraud.

Eeonomy, botli in tnllls

or

1:·xpense and filing spac<', is undoubtedly th<> l'<'ason for
thP size of thP DPf Pndant's form (assuming that tlk
sizc> is small). 1"1hPreforP, unle>ss economy has somel1m1
lw<'orne hla111e\\'orthy, tht> sizP of the form is irrdPv:rnt.
POINT II.
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE DECEASED'S CANCEROUR

CONDITION,

PREVENTS

RECOVERY

UNDER THE INSURANCE CONTRACT REGARDLESS OF WHETHER IT WAS THE CA USE OF HER
HOSPITALIZATION.

Plain ti ff in his trial hr id's, argues that the ca us<'
of death wa:-; not the non-disclosed earn-er, and il1Nefo1T,
the fact of fraud was immaterial. lie eited l'toh ('odr

Ann. ~31-19-8 (1965); and sevPral Ptah cases in point.

lt was apparently on this basis that th<> trial eon rt l1<·ld
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that regardless of the question of "unclean hands" Defendant was liable since the cancerous condition was not
the cause of death and, therefore, the fraud was not
material.
Although Defendant is still of the opinion that the
non-disclosed cancer caused the death, it is argued that
thr cause of death is irrelevant.
rl1he old statute was repealed in 1963 and the new
provisions, changing the concept of materiality, is found
in the 1965 Code Supplement.
~31-19-8

(See Utah Code Ann.

(Supp. 1965 compiler's note page 63). Under

tlie new statute, subsection (a) \vill prevent recovery
:-;imply if the appliration was fraudulent. Under subst:•ction ( c) if the non-disclosed hazard would have made
a ('hange in the poliry. The trial eourt found both of
1IH'se:

that there was fraud and that tlw insurance com-

pany would haw attarhed a rider if it had knO\vn the
C'oneealed eancProus condition. Tlw subsections new provisions are in the disjunctive. Recovery will be preVt>lli!"d if t>ither (a(, (h) or (r) is found. Subsection (b)
is r>one<>rn<'d

with materiality. llowt>ver, th(_• makriality

l'onnd tl!Prein is that the non-disclosure is material either
11.1 tlJP

imrnranee of the policy or the cause of death. lu

I l1is <:asp

the trial court found that the no.n-disclosure

11 Hs n1aterial to the issuance of the policy
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It may be speculated on ·why the legislature changed
the old statute to omit materiality from subsection (a).
Two possible reasons are quite evident. Ont• might lw
the difficulty of proving the cause of death, as in thi~
casP. Defendant is still of H1P opinion that the cane('!'
caused thP death. 'rhis is a question that doctor's miµJ1t
argue about and the answer may nev<'r he proven cm1<'1usivt>ly. Court's are ill-Pquipp0d to dtit'ide such issues.
Also, for instance, in this emw, tht.• non-(fo;closed cane<"!'
might not have been the inmwdiatP eausP of death, but
it could havP put thP d<•ceased's hod>· in :-;uch a condition,
that she ·was unable to snceessfull>· combat the disPatw
immediately causing the dPath. A seC'ond rPason for tJw
l<•gislatnre's anwndment may havt• sirnpl.\· hPen to prevent applieant's from attempting to dufraud insurance
eompaniPs. Not only is tht· fraud an t>vil in itself, lrni
it also ma)' incn. as<' insnrane<' eost's to the genera] pnhhand it CPrtainly lt•ads to litigation. 1~!wse are tr:o pos:~:_
Iii<• motives lwhind thP leµ:islativ<· m11<·11<lm<'nt doing a\\':l)
\\'ith matf·riality.
b'urthPrn1ore, I)pfendant arg-ues tliat the fraud i~
rnaterial as r<-'qnirP<l by th<• old statntP regardlPs;.; of
"·ltetlwr the

rn~w

statute r<•quires materiality. TJw rna-

t<·riality required hy the old statutP, as well as subsection ( h) of tl1e nPw statntP relatP tn a non-disclosed risk
that wonl<l affrd tlw "a<·ePptaiw<· ol' tli<' hazard" eausim.!
death. This is a misleading oJ' till· statut<-'. Th<• risk
hazard~ spok~·n

or in t!tf' old statuit• - - is

<1

1

to tlw int(•j'('o'1
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being insured against. Thus, the risk, in this case, is
death to the insured not merely death from a cause which
was undisclosed. It is submitted that clearing up this
ambiguity was, perhaps, another reason behind the 1963
amendment.
rrhe Plaintiff cited several cases to support his position on materiality, hut after examination of these cases,
it was found that everyone was or could have been
dPcide<l ·wholly on the basi8 of no intent. In this case,
the trial court found that the Plaintiff and deceased
had an intent to defraud. In fact, all of the cases when
dPaling with materiality speak in terms of either mat('rial ity to the ri8k of mat<>riality to the cause of death.
(In addition to the cases cited by Plaintiff, see Far1i11qfo11 1 (iranite State Fire l11s1tra11ce Co., 120 Utah
109, 2;32 P. 2d 754. Thus, Defendant argues that Plaintiff
~!iould lw denied recovery under either the old or new
~tntnt<, but particularly in view of the changes made in
the n<>w statute. See generally, Pattrrson, Essential of
lus11rr111ce Law. 380-381
1

CONCLFSION
WhilP thP Dt•f(•JHlant sy111pathizPs with the Plaintiff,
it <':lnnot be <lonhtPd that it was the Plaintiff's own
1·1nH!nd,
1

intPntional f'rnud, \\'hif'h !tas h<"Pn thP source

d tl1r> prohf< m. Jnsnrnnce cornpanie8 base their pre0

111i1m1s nncl eovPrage

on nc-tuary tablPs showing expected

12
life under disclosed circumstances. Plaintiff, intentionally did not disclose one such relevant and material
factor. Insurance companies cannot be expected to cover
when there are such unknown, intc>ntionally concealed
risks. Insurer's operate as a business, not as benefactors that will pay regardless. If insurance companies
are held liable in a situation such as this, undonhterll:·
they "\\rill either go out of business or have to raise their
premiums to ('Over slwh ('ontingent non-disclosures. This
will obviously hurt the public in gc>n<'ral; those who arr
healthy and who do not intentionally attempt to defraud
their insuranct> companies. 'l1hus, the Plaintiff should
lw denied reC'overy because of the intentional fraud.
Hespeetfully

~rn bmittt>d,

Ualen Ross,
Mitsunaga and Ro.ss

nn

East South 'I1t>mp!P
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney /ur Def'endant

